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Some argue that it is liberal multiculturalists and leftists who are the ones enabling racism,


  • Some regards racism as an inevitable consequence of ignoring the natural and insurmountable divisions between people. 

  • From this perspective and if you take this view, liberal multiculturalists and leftists are the ones enabling racism, by ignoring the psychological and sociological repercussions of squashing ineluctably dissimilar people together on buses, trains and tubes

  • Writing in the Financial Times in 2006, Lionel Shriver confessed to feeling pushed out by Guatemalan immigrants who had ‘colonised’ a recreation area in New York’s Riverside Park (‘The last few times I practised my forehand, I drew wary looks and felt unwelcome’). Asserting that the ‘full-scale invasion of the first world by the third has begun’, 

  • Shriver anticipated the Brexiteers’ comparison of immigration to Nazism. ‘Britain,’ she wrote, ‘memorialises its natives’ brave fight against the Nazis in the Second World War. But ‘the arrival of foreign populations can begin to duplicate the experience of military occupation – your nation is no longer your home.’


Some say street by street we are losing.and springing leaks everywhere.


A hailed writer, Christopher Caldwell, some called him a neocon, some called him a 'brilliant seer'
 claimed that Muslims are ‘conquering Europe’s cities, street by street’ this is happening through the consequences of undermining ‘national tradition’ by way of  ‘liberal universalism.

Tp borrow |Jean Paul Sartre’s phrase, the West is ‘springing leaks everywhere’

Is there anything more sickening than watching those preening peacocks at the Emmys.

I mean what contributions do they make to society?

And for someone to get an Oscar for impersonating another person (Trump) is political bias and toadying beyond belief.

Germany and its anti-semitisn without Jews

 ‘Anti-Semitism without Jews’ (Gunther Ande) 

 phrase for the treatment of Turkish guest-workers in postwar Germany.

Are you a 'somewhere' or an 'anywhere'?


  •  Goodhart wrote in March, and his new book proposes that

  •  the main political faultline in British society is the one dividing a powerful minority of university-educated professional, think journalists/teachers/the political class from ordinary people.
You could divide these groups from the somewheres (indigenous population) who have ‘rooted’ identities based in ‘group belonging and particular places and who are disenpowered.  ‘Somewheres’, are  in the main ‘socially conservative and communitarian by instinct’, resist immigration and diversity. Somewheres feel they are an  immutable community bound by origins to a specific place, and should have the right to remain distinctive.

The  Anywheres’ prize ‘autonomy, mobility and novelty’ over ‘group identity, tradition and national social contracts’.  They prize globalism, open borders,  diversity, encourage immigration and wail that Hillary did not win.

Too diverse, squashed together in unfamiliar worlds


  • In a Prospect article titled ‘Too Diverse

  • ‘We not only live among stranger citizens … squashed together on buses, trains and tubes,’ he observed, ‘but we must share with them.’ 

  • Elsewhere, he has argued that ‘most of us prefer our own kind’ and that immigration is undermining social solidarity and traditional identities, eroding Britain’s ‘common culture’ and making it ‘increasingly full of mysterious and unfamiliar worlds’. 

  • Elites supporting ‘separatist’ multiculturalism, he wrote, had ‘privileged minority identities over common citizenship’. Consequently, they had drifted out of touch with the views of ordinary people
You don't have t be  a brave contrarian, resisting a tenacious metropolitan consensus  was in favour of immigration and multiculturalism; for there are many now who have 'come out' 
and wear the badge of 'I am now post-liberal and proud'. For we have had enough of 
 admiring  the cognitive elites and their soi disant marvellous articulacy

Can the Western way of life survive?


Edward Luce, a Financial Times columnist based in Washington DC, isn’t sure ‘whether the Western way of life, and our liberal democratic systems, can survive’. Many commentators now share the view of Bill Emmott, the former editor of the Economist, who writes in his new book that we are ‘present at the destruction’ of ‘the West’, the ‘world’s most successful political idea

Donald Trump has also chimed in, asking ‘whether the West has the will to survive’

and 

Douglas Murray, associate editor of the Spectator, thinks that Trump might just save Western civilisation

The death of the Democrats through identity politics

Last November, Columbia University historian Mark Lilla published a comment piece in the New York Times, entitled The End of Identity Liberalism. Numbed by Trump’s election victory, Lilla placed the blame largely at the door of “identity politics”, which, he argued, had atomised American politics, undermined civic culture and destroyed the Democrats’ electoral chances. Liberalism, he wrote, “has slipped into a kind of moral panic about racial, gender and sexual identity that has distorted liberalism’s message and prevented it from becoming a unifying force capable of governing”.

Now Lilla’s op-ed has become a book, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics. Its publication has reignited the debate over the politics of identity. According to Lilla, the high point of American liberalism came with Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s, which focused not on individual needs but on the collective good. To regain power, Lilla argues, the liberal left needs to rediscover that notion of the common good by adopting a pragmatic form of politics. He is particularly caustic about protest movements such as Black Lives Matter. “We need no more marchers,” he writes. “We need more mayor

Between them, Lilla and his critics sum up well the impasse of contemporary politics on the left. Many of his critics cannot see that the politics of identity, far from defending the marginalised and the powerless, fragments the possibilities of meaningful social change. Lilla cannot see that the self-proclaimed “liberal centrist” politics he espouses has helped create the fragmentation of which he despairs. In Europe, too, debates about immigration and multiculturalism, about nationalism and federalism, expose a similar kind of deadlock. The roots of contemporary identity politics lie in the new social movements that emerged in the 1960s to challenge the failure of the left to take seriously the issues of racism, homophobia and women’s rights. The struggle for black rights in America, in particular, was highly influential in providing a template for many other groups to develop concepts of identity and self-organisation. Squeezed between an intensely racist society, on the one hand, and a left often indifferent to their plight, many black activists ceded from civil rights organisations and set up separate black groups.

That hollowing out has been exacerbated by the narrowing of the political sphere, by politics that has self-consciously become less ideological, more technocratic. The Democrats in America have discarded much of their old ideological attachments as well as their links to their old social constituencies. Dick Morris, former chief political adviser to the then president Bill Clinton, whom Lilla lauds, called this the process of “triangulation” – the left stealing the right’s clothes, so that it can appear to be above ideological politics. It was an approach appropriated by Tony Blair for New Labour; many see in Emmanuel Macron’s policies an attempt to fashion a new Gallic version of the same.

 One of the consequences of the mainstreaming of identity politics is that, on both sides of the Atlantic, racism is becoming rebranded as white identity politics.

Keynes and how his philosophy pf spending money you don't have saved Capitalism

ohn Maynard Keynes, 1st Baron Keynes[2] CB FBA (/ˈknz/KAYNZ; 5 June 1883 – 21 April 1946), was a British economist whose ideas fundamentally changed the theory and practice of macroeconomics and the economic policies of governments. He built on and greatly refined earlier work on the causes of business cycles, and is widely considered to be one of the most influential economists of the 20th century and the founder of modern macroeconomics.[3][4][5][6] His ideas are the basis for the school of thought known as Keynesian economics and its various offshoots.
In the 1930s, Keynes spearheaded a revolution in economic thinking, challenging the ideas of neoclassical economics that held that free markets would, in the short to medium term, automatically provide full employment, as long as workers were flexible in their wage demands. He instead argued that aggregate demanddetermined the overall level of economic activity and that inadequate aggregate demand could lead to prolonged periods of high unemployment. Keynes advocated the use of fiscal and monetary policies to mitigate the adverse effects of economic recessions and depressions.
Following the outbreak of World War II, the leading Western economies adopted Keynes's policy recommendations, and in the two decades following Keynes's death in 1946, almost all capitalistgovernments had done so. Keynes's influence waned in the 1970s, partly as a result of the stagflation that plagued the Anglo-Americaneconomies during that decade, and partly because of criticism of Keynesian policies by Milton Friedman and other monetarists.[7] He and other economists had disputed the ability of government to regulate the business cycle favourably with fiscal policy.[8]
The advent of the global financial crisis of 2007–08 caused a resurgence in Keynesian thought. Keynesian economics provided the theoretical underpinning for economic policies undertaken in response to the crisis by President Barack Obama of the United States, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom, and other heads of governments.[9]
When Time magazine included Keynes among its Most Important People of the Century in 1999, it said that "his radical idea that governments should spend money they don't have may have saved capitalism."[10] The Economist has described Keynes as "Britain's most famous 20th-century economist."[11] In addition to being an economist, Keynes was also a civil servant, a director of the Bank of England, and a part of the Bloomsbury Group of intellectuals.[

Marcus Aurelius and his Meditations one of the greatest works of philosophy.

Marcus Aurelius (/ɔːˈrliəs/LatinMarcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus;[6][notes 1][9] 26 April 121 – 17 March 180 AD) was Emperor of Rome from 161 to 180. He ruled with Lucius Verus as co-emperor from 161 until Verus' death in 169. Marcus Aurelius was the last of the so-called Five Good Emperors. He was a practitioner of Stoicism, and his untitled writing, commonly known as Meditations, is a significant source of the modern understanding of ancient Stoic philosophy, and is considered by many commentators to be one of the greatest works of philosophy.[10]
During his reign, the Roman Empire defeated a revitalized Parthian Empire in the East: Aurelius' general Avidius Cassius sacked the capital Ctesiphon in 164. In central Europe, Aurelius fought the MarcomanniQuadi, and Sarmatians with success during the Marcomannic Wars, although the threat of the Germanic peoplesbegan to represent a troubling reality for the Empire. A revolt in the East led by Avidius Cassius failed to gain momentum and was suppressed immediately. Persecution of Christians increased during his reign.
Aurelius' Meditations, written in Greek while on campaign between 170 and 180, is still revered as a literary monument to a philosophy of service and duty, describing how to find and preserve equanimity, a state of psychological stability and composure, in the midst of conflict by following nature as a source of guidance and inspiration. His death in 180 is widely cited as the end of the Pax Romana and the increasing instability in the west that followed has traditionally been seen as the beginning of the eventual Fall of the Western Roman Empire.

Cicero the man who caused a woman to attack him with a hair pin

The peak of Cicero's authority and prestige came during the 18th-century Enlightenment,[10] and his impact on leading Enlightenment thinkers and political theorists such as John LockeDavid HumeMontesquieu and Edmund Burke was substantial.[11]His works rank among the most influential in 

Marcus Tullius Cicero 3 January 106 BC – 7 December 43 BC) was a Roman politician and lawyer, who served as consul in the year 63 BC. He came from a wealthy municipal family of the Roman equestrian order, and is considered one of Rome's greatest orators and prose stylists.[2][3]

His influence on the Latin language was so immense that the subsequent history of prose, not only in Latin but in European languages up to the 19th century, was said to be either a reaction against or a return to his style.[4] According to Michael Grant, "the influence of Cicero upon the history of European literature and ideas greatly exceeds that of any other prose writer in any language".[5]Cicero introduced the Romans to the chief schools of Greek philosophy and created a Latin philosophical vocabulary (with neologisms such as evidentia,[6] humanitasqualitasquantitas, and essentia)[7] distinguishing himself as a translator and philosophe


European culture, and today still constitute one of the most important bodies of primary material for the writing and revision of Roman history, especially the last days of the Roman Republic.[12]

Cicero’s dazzling swansong of invective
Eventually the assassins caught up with him in his litter en route for the coast, slit his throat and packed off his head and hands to Antony and his wife Fulvia, as proof that the deed had been done. When the gruesome parcel arrived, Antony ordered that the remnants be displayed in the Forum, nailed to the spot where Cicero had delivered many of his devastating tirades; but not before Fulvia had taken the head on her lap, and – so the story goes – opened the mouth, pulled out the tongue and stabbed it again and again with a pin taken from her hair.
few birth pains

The story of Fulvia’s violence against Cicero’s severed head has implications beyond the routine sadism of Roman political life.
suffered few labour pains’ – a shorthand in the ancient tradition for the birth of an extraordinary child. I
 At the same time, she was transforming an innocent object of female adornment into a devastating weapon.

 For scholars of the Enlightenment, his philosophical treatises were a beacon of rationality. In an extraordinary fable told by Voltaire, a Roman embassy to the Chinese imperial Court wins the admiration of the sceptical Emperor only after they have read him a translation of Cicero’s dialogue On Divination (which carefully dissects the practice of augury, oracles and fortune-telling)

Jusqu’à quand Kabila abuserez-vous de notre patience?’ demanded one member of the Congolese opposition of the new President earlier this year. ‘How long, José María Aznar, will you abuse our patience?’ asked a

cal language of the modern world. But words which started life as a threat uttered by the spokesman of 
the established order against the dissident are now almost universally deployed the other way round.

From Darwin to Nietzsche – Marcus was an intellectual hero. Even Bill Clinton claimed (according to Frank McLynn in his new biography) ‘to have read and reread’ the Meditations during his presidency

Sartre and Heidegger on our actions

For, in the first instance, Heidegger has indicated an essence for action.  Such an indication was not suggested by Sartre as he merely assumes we know what he means by the term.  If we will recall, the latter stated that ‘existence precedes essence’, and that what we are is established by what we do, by our action, by our deeds.  Yet, Heidegger has already taken a step back from such a routine and facile characterisation of action by asking after the ‘essence’ of action.  In other words, if, for Sartre, our essence is determined by our actions or deeds, but if, for Heidegger, the essence of action has not been ‘pondered decisively enough’, then our essence cannot be determined by actions or deeds, if that is, we have not yet thought clearly about action and its essence.  Or, on the contrary, we will be forced to state that our essence, which follows our existence is determined by an act or event, the essence (Wesen) of which precedes our essence (essentia) and our existence (existentalia).

Heidegger begins his “Letter on Humanism” by noting that our notion of action is too often narrowly thought in terms of cause and effect. Consequently, the human being is conceived as only an acting agent.  By action or activity one simply means the power to cause an effect—i.e., a causality.  As such, the value we attach to any being or activity is construed only in terms of utility, that is to say, what an act does or can do for a particular end or purpose.  Action in this  sense is merely a means toward the actualization of mechanical, utilitarian ends.  According to Heidegger, we are in the habit of thinking of action within the heteronomy of means-ends, a habit whose genealogy can be traced in the evolution of the idea of making-actual from ενεργεια (energeia) to actualitas to Wirklichkeit, and so forth.  One recalls here Hegel’s famous dictum:  “Action is the clearest revelation of the individual, of his temperament as well as his aims—what a man is at bottom and in his inmost being comes into actuality only by his action” (See Hegel, Aesthetics, Vol 1, p. 219).



As we shall see, this for Heidegger is the wrong way of understanding the human.  In “Letter on Humanism” (1946, published as Brief über den Humanismus, citations here are from Pathmarks, Cambridge University Press, 1998), Heidegger sets out to articulate a humanism that is proper to the truth of Being understood as Da-sein.  He does so by establishing a higher, non-instrumental sense of thinking that would be adequate to a philosophy of Da-sein.  With this task in mind, Heidegger levels a critique against a certain tradition of philosophical humanism, whose basis in Western metaphysics has led to a pre-ontological misinterpretation of Being, which as a result has generated a severely narrow understanding of action, the human, and with it the true philosophical import of humanism.  Yet, it is important to underline at the outset that although Heidegger’s “Letter” constitutes a critique of philosophical humanism, it is in the end an effort to reground metaphysics in a more originary, hence, more supreme form of humanism.  Heidegger’s critique of philosophical humanism does not therefore amount to abolishing metaphysics once and for all.  As in Kant, who, in writing a transcendental or critical philosophy, did not deny the possibility of metaphysics but was himself in search of a properly scientific metaphysics, Heidegger elucidates the limits of traditional philosophical humanism in order to reground metaphysics in a manner that would be adequate to what he calls “the proper dignity of man” (die eigentliche Wurde des Menschen).  Thus, we can say that at the moment the Heideggerian criticism makes it assault on philosophical humanism, a higher form is posited as philosophy’s essential aim.  This is because for Heidegger the principal task of a genuine philosophical humanism is to return to the essence of man and thereby preserve the humanitas of the homo humanus.  We will see that this philosophical project to restore man’s humanity to a prior essence hinges on a reconceptualize of thinking (Denken) as “action” and thematized as a return of man to his proper home.

How to think Being?  This question will guide us in our summary and reconstruction of Heidegger’s arguments in “Letter on Humanism.”  But we must first ask what is called “thinking” and by virtue of what do we think Being?  These questions contain a paradox, for when one thinks, when one engages in the activity of thinking, does not one, in principle, always already presuppose a category of being?  Or to put it another way, when we think, do we not cling to, and in some sense only think of, beings?  For even to think of the idea of nonbeing implies the beingness of such an idea.  The paradox concerning the thinking of Being can be stated in the following way:  although Being is always the being of a being, it is different from beings, for Being belongs to something other and more originary than the simple objective presence of beings.  In short, Being is not itself a being.  According to Heidegger, the question of Being, not only being as being but the Being of beings, the nature of Being as such, has not been properly thought.  Metaphysics has in fact failed to account for the ontological ground of Being because it has not sufficiently understood what is meant by thinking, that is, it has not arrived at a proper mode of thinking the Being of beings.  “The thinking of being,” Heidegger remarks, “makes itself unrecognizable to us” (“Letter,” 275).  In many of his lectures, Heidegger demonstrates how in the history of Western philosophy, from the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, to subsequent thinkers from Aquinas, Kant, Hegel down to Nietzsche and on, the question of being has been inadequately formulated.  Whether they conceived of being as soul, substance, ενεργεια (energeia), Οὐσία (ousia), spirit, matter, force, consciousness, becoming, life, representation, will, or the eternal occurence of the same and so forth, philosophers have merely grasped beings as beings, without properly comprehending the manner in which beings “be.”  For Heidegger, the first and last, most essential, because most basic, question of philosophy must be the question of the meaning of being in general:  “What does being signify?  Whence can something like being in general be understood?  How is understanding of being at all possible?” (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 15).

It is the task of philosophy to lay the ground (Grundlegung) for the proper thinking of being.  With this task in mind, Heidegger will want “thinking” (Denken) to mean something fundamentally different from our everyday understanding of the term.  Thinking for Heidegger is a kind of action, but it is not action in terms of a simple causality.  Thinking is presupposed in all action and production, but it is something that surpasses all praxis.  In other words, thinking is not reducible to τέχνη (techné), or technical reasoning.  Heidegger elevates thinking into a higher sense in order to think Being not in terms of factual existence (i.e., the Was-sein or whatness of beings, its essentia), but in terms of ek-sistence (we will say more about the concept of ek-sistence below).  Heidegger thus proposes a different understanding of thinking that will enable a more originary, more profound, view of being.  It seems to me that what Heidegger has in mind in his aim to reconceptualize thinking is to attain this more profound view of being, and with it a higher meaning of the world.  If we may quote once again from Heidegger’s earlier The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, we can sense what is at stake for Heidegger in developing a mode of thinking that would be prior to all factual (empirical) experiences of beings:
We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we understand something like being.  If we did not understand, even though at first roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then the actual would remain hidden from us.  If we did not understand what reality means, then the real would remain inaccessible.  If we did not understand what life and vitality signify, then we would not be able to comport ourselves toward living beings.  If we did not understand what existence and existentiality signify, then we ourselves would not be able to exist as Dasein.  If we did not understand what permanence and constancy signify, then constant geometric relations or numerical proportions would remain a secret to us.  We must understand actuality, reality, vitality, existentiality, constancy in order to be able to comport ourselves positively toward specifically actual, real, living, existing, constant beings.  We must understand being so that we may be able to be given over to a world that is, so that we can exist in it and be our own Dasein itself as a being.  We must be able to understand actuality before all experience of actual beings. (§ 2 The concept of philosophy: Philosophy and World-View)
Everything thus depends on this higher sense of thinking, without which the truth of the world will remain “hidden,” a “secret.”  What, then, is thinking?  For Heidegger, thinking is described in the “Letter” as the awaiting for “the advent of Being, to Being as advent” (“Letter,” 275).  Thinking accomplishes this.  It accomplishes this what-arrives (the “advent”) of Being as the very destiny of thinking itself.  It is the bringing or sending forth of man to the fullness of the essence of Being: a kind of self-affectation of one’s sense of be-ing, something not unlike the “I think” of Kant’s transcendental apperception.  Now, in Heidegger, the question “What is thinking?” is necessarily tied to the question “What is Man?,” which is pursued in terms of what is proper to man. As Derrida elsewhere suggests, “for in this question [“What is Man?”] it is man himself who is determining himself by questioning about himself, about his being, discovering himself in this way to be of a questioning essence in the Fragen” (see The Beast and the Sovereign, 264).  Hence, again, thinking as self-affecting.  Before anything else, thinking sends man over to discover and dwell in the essence of his Being as ek-sistence.  What is important to note in Heidegger is that this more originary thinking is always prior to a mode of thinking that is representational or a giving-form, in the manner of Aristotle. Thinking does not make or cause a relation—it is not a simple.

We need unmediated reality that is why we need Myth


In Shaekspeare's AS You Like It  the the Duke praises the very discomforts of the forest on the ground that they afford an unmediated reality.

At the same time his speech is marked by a pronounced rhetorical elegance and the imagery he uses, tongues in trees, sermons in stones, books in running brooks, seems to betray a courtier’s love of language. Even as he praises Nature for her pre-linguistic purity he assimilates her to language. When the Duke has finished, he is pleased to receive Amiens’ compliment:
                       Happy is your grace.

We need Ovidian licentious imagination. 

MYTHS - are all about what never happened and always is.

 Myths are narratives and are notoriously located in the distant past but we know, and I think Ovid knew, that these things never actually happened. The Neoplatonist Sallustius (fourth century AD) said that myth was all about ‘what never happened and always is’. 

The Left - idealists with stained hands

On DACA any questions bowled to Democrats is batted stoically with unshakeable equanimity, even though what may undergird their stoicism is humanity to some  and inhumanity to 
US citizens.

Are you displaying humanist temdendcies when you criticise Humanism?

Humanism is a philosophical and ethical stance that emphasizes the value and agency of human beings, individually and collectively, and generally prefers critical thinking and evidence (rationalism and empiricism) over acceptance of dogma or superstition.


So what of the left's dogma that their way is the way

The meaning of the term humanism has fluctuated according to the successive intellectual movements which have identified with it.[1] The term was coined by theologian Friedrich Niethammer at the beginning of the 19th century. Generally, however, humanism refers to a perspective that affirms some notion of human freedom and progress.

So is socialisn (leftist thinking) 'progress'?

In modern times, humanist movements are typically non-religious movements aligned with secularism, and today humanism typically refers to a nontheistic life stance centred on human agency and looking to science rather than revelation from a supernatural source to understand the world

If you want revelation - pitch with the classics
For Cicero, a lawyer, what most distinguished humans from brutes was speech, which, allied to reason, could (and should) enable them to settle disputes and live together in concord and harmony under the rule of law.[8] 

After the French Revolution, the idea that human virtue could be created by human reason alone independently from traditional religious institutions, attributed by opponents of the Revolution to Enlightenment philosophes such as Rousseau, was violently attacked by influential religious and political conservatives, such as Edmund Burkeand Joseph de Maistre, as a deification or idolatry of humanity.[17] Humanism began to acquire a negative sense.

 Liberal reformers and radicals embraced the idea of Humanism as an alternative religion of humanity.
worship,  deification of humanity") pours scorn on the supernatural pretensions of scripture, combining Voltairean mockery with Paine's own style of taproom ridicule to expose the absurdity of a theology built on a collection of incoherent Levantine (- the former name for the geographical area of the eastern Mediterranean that is now occupied by Lebanon, Syria),
S. Eliot considered humanism to be sentimental "slop" (Hulme)[citation needed]or "an old bitch gone in the teeth" (Pound)[72] and wanted to go back to a more manly, authoritarian society such as existed in the Middle Ages.

Postmodern critics who are self-described anti-humanists, such as Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault, have asserted that humanism posits an overarching and excessively abstract notion of humanity or universal human nature, which can then be used as a pretext for imperialism and domination of those deemed somehow less than human.

Think Clinton and her use of the perjorative half wit deplorables

 "Humanism fabricates the human as much as it fabricates the nonhuman animal", suggests Timothy Laurie, turning the human into what he calls "a placeholder for a range of attributes that have been considered most virtuous among humans (e.g. rationality, altruism), rather than most commonplace (e.g. hunger, anger)".[

Nevertheless, philolosopher Kate Soper[74] notes that by faulting humanism for falling short of its own benevolent ideals, anti-humanism thus frequently "secretes a humanist rhetoric
 Humanism. Davies acknowledges that after the horrific experiences of the wars of the 20th century "it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like 'the destiny of man' or the 'triumph of human reason' without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them". For "it is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of human reason". . 
For one thing humanism remains on many occasions the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organise and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these can only be articulated in humanist terms."